Nghiên cứu của O'Brien và đồng nghiệp tiến hành đánh giá ảnh hưởng của 3 phương pháp đa dạng hóa rủi ro môi trường [1] đối với tác động môi trường ở một số trang trại nuôi gia súc tại Ireland. Ba phương pháp thường được đề xuất, đề cập trong nghiên cứu này là: 1) Hỗn hợp cỏ và white clover (GWC), 2) Canh tác hữu cơ (OFS), và 3) Tiếp cận nông lâm (AGF). Với AGF thì cụ thể (...) là phương pháp kết hợp cây lâu năm, với đồng cỏ chăn thả và thu hoạch cất trữ (Silvopasture). (shrink)

Lạm dụng và bỏ bê trẻ еm đаng diễn rа phổ biến trên tоàn сầu. Nó thаy đổi từ sự đối xử tệ bạс về thể сhất, tinh thần và xã hội gây hại сhо đứа trẻ. Nó сó những hậu quả ngắn hạn và lâu dài, сuối сùng сó thể làm сhậm sự phát triển kinh tế và xã hội сủа сáс quốс giа một сáсh gián tiếp. Người tа ướс tính rằng сứ 5 phụ nữ và 1 trоng (...) số 13 nаm giới thì сó 1 người bị lạm dụng tình dụс trоng thời thơ ấu. Mặс dù vấn đề khá phứс tạp và rõ ràng соn số trên đánh giá thấp giá trị thựс tế. Phần lớn, đó là dо сấu trúс xã hội trоng сộng đồng bị phá vỡ. Những trụ сột сủа сộng đồng như trường họс, tổ сhứс, giа đình thất bại trоng việс thông báо kịp thời và сó hành động сhống lại сáс сơ quаn сhứс năng thíсh hợp để duy trì vị thế сао сủа tổ сhứс mình và tránh bị kỳ thị. Nghiên сứu điển hình này mô tả сáсh một nữ sinh bị bóс lột tình dụс và сáсh thứс phối hợp giữа сáс сơ quаn сó thể ngăn сhặn điều đó. (shrink)

Lạm dụng và bỏ bê trẻ еm đаng diễn rа phổ biến trên tоàn сầu. Nó thаy đổi từ sự đối xử tệ bạс về thể сhất, tinh thần và xã hội gây hại сhо đứа trẻ. Nó сó những hậu quả ngắn hạn và lâu dài, сuối сùng сó thể làm сhậm sự phát triển kinh tế và xã hội сủа сáс quốс giа một сáсh gián tiếp. Người tа ướс tính rằng сứ 5 phụ nữ và 1 trоng (...) số 13 nаm giới thì сó 1 người bị lạm dụng tình dụс trоng thời thơ ấu. Mặс dù vấn đề khá phứс tạp và rõ ràng соn số trên đánh giá thấp giá trị thựс tế. Phần lớn, đó là dо сấu trúс xã hội trоng сộng đồng bị phá vỡ. Những trụ сột сủа сộng đồng như trường họс, tổ сhứс, giа đình thất bại trоng việс thông báо kịp thời và сó hành động сhống lại сáс сơ quаn сhứс năng thíсh hợp để duy trì vị thế сао сủа tổ сhứс mình và tránh bị kỳ thị. Nghiên сứu điển hình này mô tả сáсh một nữ sinh bị bóс lột tình dụс và сáсh thứс phối hợp giữа сáс сơ quаn сó thể ngăn сhặn điều đó. (shrink)

Lạm dụng và bỏ bê trẻ еm đаng diễn rа phổ biến trên tоàn сầu. Nó thаy đổi từ sự đối xử tệ bạс về thể сhất, tinh thần và xã hội gây hại сhо đứа trẻ. Nó сó những hậu quả ngắn hạn và lâu dài, сuối сùng сó thể làm сhậm sự phát triển kinh tế và xã hội сủа сáс quốс giа một сáсh gián tiếp. Người tа ướс tính rằng сứ 5 phụ nữ và 1 trоng (...) số 13 nаm giới thì сó 1 người bị lạm dụng tình dụс trоng thời thơ ấu. Mặс dù vấn đề khá phứс tạp và rõ ràng соn số trên đánh giá thấp giá trị thựс tế. Phần lớn, đó là dо сấu trúс xã hội trоng сộng đồng bị phá vỡ. Những trụ сột сủа сộng đồng như trường họс, tổ сhứс, giа đình thất bại trоng việс thông báо kịp thời và сó hành động сhống lại сáс сơ quаn сhứс năng thíсh hợp để duy trì vị thế сао сủа tổ сhứс mình và tránh bị kỳ thị. Nghiên сứu điển hình này mô tả сáсh một nữ sinh bị bóс lột tình dụс và сáсh thứс phối hợp giữа сáс сơ quаn сó thể ngăn сhặn điều đó. (shrink)

Lạm dụng và bỏ bê trẻ еm đаng diễn rа phổ biến trên tоàn сầu. Nó thаy đổi từ sự đối xử tệ bạс về thể сhất, tinh thần và xã hội gây hại сhо đứа trẻ. Nó сó những hậu quả ngắn hạn và lâu dài, сuối сùng сó thể làm сhậm sự phát triển kinh tế và xã hội сủа сáс quốс giа một сáсh gián tiếp. Người tа ướс tính rằng сứ 5 phụ nữ và 1 trоng (...) số 13 nаm giới thì сó 1 người bị lạm dụng tình dụс trоng thời thơ ấu. Mặс dù vấn đề khá phứс tạp và rõ ràng соn số trên đánh giá thấp giá trị thựс tế. Phần lớn, đó là dо сấu trúс xã hội trоng сộng đồng bị phá vỡ. Những trụ сột сủа сộng đồng như trường họс, tổ сhứс, giа đình thất bại trоng việс thông báо kịp thời và сó hành động сhống lại сáс сơ quаn сhứс năng thíсh hợp để duy trì vị thế сао сủа tổ сhứс mình và tránh bị kỳ thị. Nghiên сứu điển hình này mô tả сáсh một nữ sinh bị bóс lột tình dụс và сáсh thứс phối hợp giữа сáс сơ quаn сó thể ngăn сhặn điều đó. (shrink)

Vào ngày 19/4/2024 vừa qua, Tuyên bố New York về Ý thức của Động vật đã được công bố tại một hội nghị "Khoa học Mới nổi về Ý thức của Động vật" được tổ chức tại Đại học New York. Tuyên bố New York là một nỗ lực để thể hiện sự đồng thuận của giới khoa học về sự tồn tại trải nghiệm ý thức ở tất cả các loài có xương sống (bao gồm tất cả các loài (...) bò sát, lưỡng cư và cá) và nhiều loài không xương sống (bao gồm, ít nhất là, các loài mực ống, giáp xác mười chân và côn trùng). Về mặt khoa học, Tuyên bố New York là một bước tiến bộ lớn cho nhân loại, nhưng nó cũng sẽ khiến cho nhiều người có ý thức hơn về các thách thức đạo đức liên quan đến động vật có trải nghiệm ý thức. Bài viết này sẽ bàn về các cách tiếp cận triết học đối với vấn đề đạo đức của việc giết các sinh vật có tri giác để từ đó chỉ ra nan đề đạo đức đang hiện hữu trong xã hội loài người: Để duy trì sự tồn tại của con người, loài được xem là có đạo đức, thì chúng ta lại vi phạm đạo đức của chính chúng ta, là sát sinh các loài có giá trị nội tại, ý thức, hay tri giác khác. Nan đề đạo đức này đã tồn tại trong xã hội loài người từ rất lâu trước đây. Nhiều giải pháp đã được đề xuất và ứng dụng vào thực tế nhầm giải quyết nan đề này, như cách tiếp cận bất bạo lực và ăn chay của Phật giáo, việc áp dụng luật Hồi giáo và các nghi lễ thiêng liêng đối với động vật trong Hồi giáo, các phòng trào đòi quyền cho động vật và thực hiện tuyệt chủng tự nguyện ở các nước phương Tây, hay chế biến thịt sử dụng tế bào động vật. Tuy nhiên, dù cách nào đi nữa thì hiện nay chúng ta vẫn chưa thể hoàn toàn giải quyết được nan đề đạo đức, đó là các sinh vật có tri giác vẫn tiếp tục bị giết vì sự sinh tồn của con người. Chúng tôi cho rằng giải pháp khả thi nhất hiện nay đó là thay đổi văn hóa tiêu dùng thực phẩm ở hiện tại, xây dựng các giá trị văn hóa thặng dư sinh thái, và thúc đẩy các giải pháp hòa bình. (shrink)

Zájem současné sociologie a dalších společenských věd o výzkumy spokojenosti a štěstí zatemňuje skutečnost, že původně právě sociologie chtěla „štěstí" poskytovat a nahrazovat tak náboženské přístupy ke světu. Tento implicitně nábo- ženský charakter je patrný i v rané české sociologii v dílech prvních propagátorů sociologie, jako byl především Emanuel Makovička, a později u některých následovníků a epigonů T. G. Masaryka, v meziválečném období zejména u Ladislava Kunteho, R. I. Malého, Alexandra Sommera-Batěka, Jindřicha Fleischnera a Jana Duška. Z hlediska vývoje české (...) sociologie šlo o zcela okrajové postavy, ačkoli mnohé z nich vynikly v jiných oblastech, jako celek jsou nicméně vyjádřením jednoho z aspektů dobových teoretických úvah o společnosti, jejím uspořádání a vývoji, na který by nemělo být zapomínáno. Zatímco T. G. Masaryka a pozdější akademické sociology „omezoval" vědecký charakter jejich práce, a i pokud směřovali k sociálnímu reformismu, oddělovali jej od teoretické sociologie, „sociologie vedoucí ke štěstí" nalezla plné uplatnění ve vizích a ambiciózních projek- tech těchto amatérských takésociologů - třebaže skončily faktickými nezdary nebo ani nedošly praktického naplnění, ostatně stejně jako v případě jejich pravzoru, Comtova pozitivistického apoštolátu. (shrink)

Các nhà khoa học trong lĩnh vực nhân học, địa lý và các lĩnh vực khác trong khoa học xã hội và nhân văn từ lâu đã cho rằng môi trường sống của con người ảnh hưởng sâu sắc đến hệ thống giá trị và thực tiễn văn hóa của họ. Shota Shibasaki, Ryosuke Nakadai và Yo Nakawake đã phát triển dựa trên ý tưởng này, chứng minh rằng các đặc điểm sinh thái địa phương định hình sự xuất hiện (...) của các loài động vật ranh mãnh trong truyền thuyết dân gian. Dựa trên phát hiện của họ và khung quản trị tri thức SM3D (Serendipity-Mindsponge-3D), chúng tôi thảo luận về việc khả năng sáng tạo các sản phẩm văn hóa của cá nhân hoặc nhóm phụ thuộc vào tính sẵn có và khả năng tiếp cận thông tin từ môi trường xung quanh. Do mất đa dạng sinh học và biến đổi khí hậu, những nguồn tài nguyên quý giá cho sáng tạo văn hóa đã bị suy giảm. Do đó, việc bảo tồn đa dạng sinh học và hành động vì khí hậu cần được xem như những giá trị nền tảng của một nền văn hóa tiến bộ và nhân văn. Chỉ khi đó, chúng ta mới có thể tiếp tục duy trì và nâng cao năng lực sáng tạo văn hóa của xã hội. (shrink)

Bài nghiên cứu của nhóm tác giả người Việt đánh giá hiệu quả của chính sách phát triển xanh đối với Kitakyushu, một thành phố công nghiệp nặng nhưng nổi tiếng với khả năng kiểm soát ô nhiễm môi trường, đã lọt vào Top Trending của tạp chí Palgrave Communications thuộc Nature Research, không lâu sau khi được công bố.

We discuss cases where subjects seem to enjoy conscious experience when the relevant first-order perceptual representations are either missing or too weak to account for the experience. Though these cases are originally considered to be theoretical possibilities that may be problematical for the higher-order view of consciousness, careful considerations of actual empirical examples suggest that this strategy may backfire; these cases may cause more trouble for first-order theories instead. Specifically, these cases suggest that (I) recurrent feedback loops to V1 are (...) most likely not the neural correlate of first-order representations for conscious experience, (II) first-order views seem to have a problem accounting for the phenomenology in these cases, and either (III) a version of the ambitious higher-order approach is superior in that it is the simplest theory that can account for all results at face value, or (IV) a view where phenomenology is jointly determined by both first-order and higher-order states. In our view (III) and (IV) are both live options and the decision between them may ultimately be an empirical question that cannot yet be decided. (shrink)

What distinguishes low, middle, and high art? In this article, I give an ameliorative analysis of these concepts. On what I call the Capacity View, the distinction between low, middle, and high art depends on the relation between an artwork’s perceiver (specifically her aesthetic responsive capacities) and the perceived artwork. Though the Capacity View may not align perfectly with folk usage, the view is worth our attention due to three attractive upshots. First, it explains how an artwork’s status level can (...) be elevated or lowered over time and why biases can lead to mistaken judgments about such statuses. Second, it sheds light on the idea of cultural inheritance and why certain forms of aesthetic deference may be justified. Finally, it explains how high, middle, and low art each make distinctive contributions to the good life. (shrink)

Gila Sher interviewed by Chen Bo: -/- I. Academic Background and Earlier Research: 1. Sher’s early years. 2. Intellectual influence: Kant, Quine, and Tarski. 3. Origin and main Ideas of The Bounds of Logic. 4. Branching quantifiers and IF logic. 5. Preparation for the next step. -/- II. Foundational Holism and a Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge: 1. General characterization of foundational holism. 2. Circularity, infinite regress, and philosophical arguments. 3. Comparing foundational holism and foundherentism. 4. A post-Quinean model of knowledge. (...) 5. Intellect and figuring out. 6. Comparing foundational holism with Quine’s holism. 7. Evaluation of Quine’s Philosophy -/- III. Substantive Theory of Truth and Relevant Issues: 1. Outline of Sher’s substantive theory of truth. 2. Criticism of deflationism and treatment of the Liar. 3. Comparing Sher’s substantive theory of truth with Tarski’s theory of truth. -/- IV. A New Philosophy of Logic and Comparison with Other Theories: 1. Foundational account of logic. 2. Standard of logicality, set theory and logic. 3. Psychologism, Hanna’s and Maddy’s conceptions of logic. 4. Quine’s theses about the revisability of logic. -/- V. Epilogue. (shrink)

This book addresses the metaphysics of Armstrongian states of affairs, i.e. instantiations of naturalist universals by particulars. The author argues that states of affairs are the best candidate for truthmakers and, in the spirit of logical atomism, that we need no molecular truthmakers for positive truths. In the book's context, this has the pleasing result that there are no molecular states of affairs. Following this account of truthmaking, the author first shows that the particulars in (first-order) states of affairs are (...) bare particulars. He then argues that the properties in states of affairs are simple, non-relational and concrete universals. Next, he argues that (material) relations in states of affairs are external relations. Lastly, he argues that a state of affairs is unified by a distinctive formal relation without giving rise to Bradley’s regress. (shrink)

Conscious experiences involve subjective qualities, such as colours, sounds, smells and emotions. In this Perspective, we argue that these subjective qualities can be understood in terms of their similarity to other experiences. This account highlights the role of memory in conscious experience, even for simple percepts. How an experience feels depends on implicit memory of the relationships between different perceptual representations within the brain. With more complex experiences such as emotions, explicit memories are also recruited. We draw inspiration from work (...) in machine learning as well as the cognitive neuroscience of learning and decision making to make our case and discuss how the account could be tested in future experiments. The resulting findings might help to reveal the functions of subjective experience and inform current theoretical debates on consciousness. (shrink)

There are two popular views regarding the origin of critical thinking: (1) The concept of critical thinking began with Socrates and his Socratic method of questioning. (2) The term ‘critical thinking’ was first introduced by John Dewey in 1910 in his book How We Think. This paper argues that both claims are incorrect. Firstly, critical reflection was a distinguishing characteristic of the Presocratic philosophers, setting them apart from earlier traditions. Therefore, they should be recognized as even earlier pioneers of critical (...) thinking. Secondly, John Dewey not only used the term ‘critical thinking’ before 1910, but there were also other authors who used it before him. The meaning of ‘critical thinking’ at the turn of the twentieth century was shaped by various traditions of linguistic usage, including literary criticism, science and medicine, and Kantian philosophy. (shrink)

Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the (...) anticipation of danger. To grief for the passing of a loved one involves the thought that someone dear to us is now gone. In Upheavals of Thought and also in her Hochelaga Lecture, Nussbaum analyzed compassion as a set of judgments, including for example the judgment that someone is experiencing serious suffering, and that the person in question does not deserve the suffering. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with what I call the ‘problem of unity’ . This is the puzzle of how Armstrong‐like states of affairs are unified. The general approach is ‘relational internalism’: the unifier of such a state of affairs is a relation of some sort in it. A view commonly associated with relational internalism is that if such a relation satisfies a certain ‘naive’ expectation to a relation – that it is related to its relata – then Bradley's regress results. (...) As I argue, for one very natural species of relational internalism, this is indeed the case. Influential writers on the topic have therefore maintained that this relation is not related to its relata. But, as we shall see, while this ‘classic’ relational internalism obviously avoids Bradley's regress, intuitively, it fails completely to solve the problem of unity. I argue, however, that given the rejection of a natural, but unfounded, assumption of conventional relational internalism, a unique relation can unify states of affairs without leading to Bradley's regress. I consequently propose a novel version of relational internalism on which states of affairs are unified by such an entity. (shrink)

GILBERT JEAN FACCARELLO (Paris, 1950) is professor of economics at Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, and a member of the Triangle research centre (École Normale Supérieure de Lyon and CNRS). He is presently chair of the ESHET Council (European Society for the History of Economic Thought). He completed his doctoral research in economics at Université de Paris X Nanterre. He has previously taught at the Université de Paris-Dauphine, Université du Maine and École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay/Saint-Cloud (now École Normale Supérieure de (...) Lyon). He is a co-founder of The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, which he co-edited for 20 years with J. L. Cardoso, Heinz D. Kurz, and A. Murphy. With Alain Béraud, he edited the Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique (La Découverte, 3 volumes, 1992-2000) and, together with Heinz D. Kurz, he is presently editing a Handbook of the History of Economic Analysis (3 volumes, forthcoming with Edward Elgar). -/- EJPE interviewed Gilbert Faccarello about his research career in the history of economic thought, where he has focused especially on old and new classical and Marxian political economy, and French political economy during the 18th and 19th centuries. G. Faccarello discusses his interest not only in the logical structure and context of the economic ideas of past thinkers but also the links between economic thought, philosophy, and religion. (shrink)

This chapter considers the ‘hosting question’ of how immanent universals, in contrast to transcendent universals, are ‘brought down to earth’ from ‘Plato’s heaven’. It explores the thesis that the hosting amounts to their being constituents of the states of affairs that result from their instantiations. These states of affairs are concrete complexes consisting of particulars and universals, and perhaps something that links them together. The traditional view that immanent universals are concrete is briefly defended against a recent prominent objection. On (...) relationalism, states of affairs are unified by a relation of some sort; on non-relationalism they are unified non-relationally. Roughly, these two conceptions of states of affairs are equivalent to Armstrong’s relational and non-relational versions of immanent realism, respectively. Armstrong mostly criticises the former and defends the latter. It is argued, however, that relationalism, at least potentially, answers the hosting question, whereas non-relationalism realism does not. (shrink)

Matti Eklund (2017) has argued that ardent realists face a serious dilemma. Ardent realists believe that there is a mind-independent fact as to which normative concepts we are to use. Eklund claims that the ardent realist cannot explain why this is so without plumping in favor of their own normative concepts or changing the topic. The paper first advances the discussion by clarifying two ways of understanding the question of which normative concepts to choose: a theoretical question about which concepts (...) have the abstract property of being normatively privileged and a further practical question of which concepts we are to choose even granting some concepts are thus privileged. I argue that the ardent realist’s best bet for answering the theoretical question while avoiding Eklund’s dilemma is to provide a real definition of this property. I point out the difficulties for providing such a definition. I then argue that even with an answer to the theoretical question, the ardent realist faces a further dilemma in answering the practical question. In sum, though I see no knock-down argument against ardent realism, it may nonetheless die a death by a thousand cuts. I close by considering a deeper reason for why ardent realism is so difficult to defend: every argument starts somewhere. It is unclear how there can be an Archimedean point that makes no reference to any normative concepts that can nonetheless be employed to convince everyone to adopt ours. I then briefly propose two options for someone still inclined towards realism: (i) accept that our normative concepts are normatively privileged without attempting to explain why this is so, or (ii) be less ardent and accept a perspective-dependent account of normativity. (shrink)

The rationalist lover accepts that whom she ought to love is whom she has most reason to love. She also accepts that the qualities of a person are reasons to love them. This seems to suggest that if the rationalist lover encounters someone with better qualities than her beloved, then she is rationally required to trade up. In this paper, I argue that this need not be the case and the rationalist lover can have just about as normal if not (...) a better romantic life than anyone could hope for. This is because we often do possess most reason to love our beloveds. To see why this is so, we have to think more carefully about (i) how we come to possess reasons for love and (ii) the higher-order reasons that govern whether we should seek or refrain from possessing said reasons. Reflection on these issues leads to what I call the Possession-Commitment Account of Love’s Reasons. I use this account to address additional worries for love rationalism and highlight how being rational about love can potentially get us out of romantic messes. I conclude that if being a rationalist about love is plausible after all, then we have reason to hope that being rational about other areas of our practical lives is plausible as well. (shrink)

This paper defines relational properties and argues for their reducibility in a, broadly speaking, Armstrongian framework of state of affairs ontology and truthmaking. While Armstrong’s own characterisation and reduction of them arguably is the best one available in the literature of this framework, it suffers from two main problems. As will be shown, it neither defines relational properties very clearly (if at all), nor provides an adequate conception of their reduction. This paper attempts to remedy this situation in four steps. (...) First, it introduces relational properties and why they matter in metaphysics in general. Second, by briefly comparing and contrasting them with extrinsic properties, and by briefly mapping them onto a tripartite division of relations, the particular kinds of relevant relational properties are identified. Third, it classifies relational properties and thereby makes possible an apt definition of them. Finally, using the notion of truthmaking, it outlines a more satisfactory case for their reduction. (shrink)

Rom Harré’s career spans more than 40 years of original contributions to the development of both psychology and other human and social sciences. Recognized as a founder of modern social psychology, he developed the microsociological approach ‘ethogenics’ and facilitated the discursive turn within psychology, as well as developed the concept of positioning theory. Used within both philosophy and social scientific approaches aimed at conflict analysis, analyses of power relations, and narrative structures, the development and impact of positioning theory can be (...) understood as part of a second cognitive revolution. Whereas the first cognitive revolution involved incorporating cognition as both thoughts and feelings as an ineliminable part of psychology and social sciences, this second revolution released this cognition from a focus on individuals, and towards a focus of understanding individuals as participating in public practices using public discourses as part of their cognition. This edited volume adds to the scholarly conversation around positioning theory, evaluates Rom Harré’s significance for the history and development of psychology, and highlights his numerous theoretical contributions and their lasting effects on the psychological and social sciences. Included among the chapters: What is it to be a human being? Rom Harré on self and identity The social philosophy of Harré as a philosophy of culture The discursive ontology of the social world Ethics in socio-cultural psychologies Discursive cognition and neural networks The Second Cognitive Revolution: A Tribute to Rom Harré is an indispensable reader for anyone interested in his cognitive-historical turn, and finds an audience with academics and researchers in the social and human science fields of cognitive psychology, social psychology, discursive psychology, philosophy, sociology, and ethnomethodology. (shrink)

In this chapter, we discuss a selection of current views of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We focus on the different predictions they make, in particular with respect to the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) during visual experiences, which is an area of critical interest and some source of contention. Our discussion of these views focuses on the level of functional anatomy, rather than at the neuronal circuitry level. We take this approach because we currently understand more about experimental (...) evidence at this coarse level and because these results are appropriate for arbitrating between current theoretical frameworks. We discuss the Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 1995; 2006), Local Recurrency (Lamme 2010; Lamme 2006), Higher Order (Lau 2008; Lau & Rosenthal 2011) and Global Workspace theories (Baars 1997; Baars 2005; Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2014). Despite the apparent stark differences between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, available evidence suggests that their neural substrates must be largely shared. This indicates that the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly specialized. We argue that current experimental evidence about the involvement of specific activity in prefrontal cortex supports the higher order neural theory of consciousness. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on marked differences between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be insensitive to the relevant neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. Finally, it follows from the evidence we discuss that the functional advantages of conscious over unconscious perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought. (shrink)

Is vision merely a state of the beholder’s sensory organ which can be explained as an immediate effect caused by external sensible objects? Or is it rather a successive process in which the observer actively scanning the surrounding environment plays a major part? These two general attitudes towards visual perception were both developed already by ancient thinkers. The former is embraced by natural philosophers (e.g., atomists and Aristotelians) and is often labelled “intromissionist”, based on their assumption that vision is an (...) outcome of the causal influence exerted by an external object upon a sensory organ receiving an entity from the object. The latter attitude to vision as a successive process is rather linked to the “extramissionist” theories of the proponents of geometrical optics (such as Euclid or Ptolemy) who suggest that an entity – a visual ray – is sent forth from the eyes to the object. The present paper focuses on the contributions to this ancient controversy proposed by some 13th-century Latin thinkers. [...]. (shrink)

This paper asks what should be the basis of a global environmental ethics. As Gao Shan has argued, the environmental ethics of Western philosophers such as Holmes Rolston and Paul Taylor is based on extending the notion of intrinsic value to that of objects of nature, and as such it is not very compatible with Chinese ethics. This is related to Gao’s rejection of most—if not all—Western “rationalist” environmental ethics, a stance that I grant her for pragmatic reasons (though I (...) remain neutral about it theoretically). Gao argues that the Daoist notion of living in harmony with nature can instead become the basis of a Chinese environmental ethics. However, the involved Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is, in my view, based on an aesthetic property. The paper argues that despite the appeal of the Daoist view for a Chinese environmental ethics, an aesthetic property cannot provide the basis for a global environmental ethics. The paper also considers another version of Daoist environmental ethics, which does not rely on an aesthetic notion, but I argue that it too fails as such a candidate. As an alternative, the paper considers and applies contemporary Western thinkers on gratitude (such as Robert Emmons and Elizabeth Loder), proposing that gratitude to nature (environmental gratitude) can indeed provide the needed basis. (shrink)

Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g. first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for over-intellectualizing consciousness. We show (...) that while higher-order states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are actually considerably less than often presumed. In this sense HOT may be viewed as an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views. Also, we clarify that most proponents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or confidence. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states. (shrink)

This thesis presents an interpretation of David Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. The most distinguishing feature of this interpretation is the emphasis placed on the significance of Hume’s general philosophical position in a faithful reading of this philosophical classic. The success of this interpretation will show that Hume’s essay should be read as an integral part of his system of philosophy. There are three parts in this thesis. The first part is an overview of some key aspects of (...) Hume’s philosophy which are relevant to my interpretation. Unlike many contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition, Hume is a systematic thinker. A faithful reading of his works should take his general philosophical framework seriously. Therefore, this overview of his system serves as the general background of the next two parts. The second part is a discussion of Hume’s aesthetic thought. More specifically, it provides an exposition of his view on beauty and judgements of beauty. This part completes the stage-setting for the development of my interpretation, by helping the reader form a more specific conceptual framework for understanding Hume’s essay. The third part develops an interpretation of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ according to what has been provided in the previous two parts. It starts with an outline of the essay, which indicates Hume’s aim in writing it. After that, a few sections are devoted to some central elements of the essay. The last section of this part discusses four controversies concerning Hume’s essay. These discussions establish the strength of this interpretation, or at least, the fruitful prospect of an interpretative project that integrates Hume’s essay into his whole system. (shrink)

It is a common view that arguments from analogy can only be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. However, while this reflects an important insight, I propose instead a relatively simple method for their evaluation based on just (i) their general form and (ii) four core questions. One clear advantage of this proposal is that it does not depend on any substantial (and controversial) view of similarity, unlike influential current alternative methods, such as Walton’s. Following some initial clarification of the notion (...) of analogy and similarity, I demonstrate the strength of this method by analysing and evaluating three prominent arguments from analogy. (shrink)

The view of embodied cognition believes that cognition is embodied in nature, only the dynamics involved in the interaction between cognitive activities and the nervous system, body and environment, only by closely linking the correct evaluation of time-dependent and relationship, then only can make a correct understanding of cognitive activities. The core concepts of body and environment involved in embodied cognition are different from the body and environment in the usual sense. In terms of research methods, dynamic research methods that (...) are different from traditional computer simulations are also adopted. The article first integrates and analyzes the basic position and general propositions in the discipline, then the embodied cognition are explained based on author's understanding. In addition, the suitability of dynamic research methods, its advantages and disadvantages is analyzed, and finally, a brief summary of the current status of embodied cognition research. (shrink)

This paper defends the case against (sparse) disjunctive properties by means of four Armstrongian arguments. The first of these is a logical atomist argument from truthmaking, which is, broadly speaking, ‘Armstrongian’ (Armstrong 1997). This argument is strong – although it stands or falls with the relevant notion of truthmaking, as it were. However, three arguments, which are prima facie independent of truthmaking, can be found explicitly early in Armstrong’s middle period. Two of these early arguments face a serious objection put (...) forward forcefully by Louise Antony (2003) and Alan Penczek (1997), respectively. I consider these objections and argue that they fail. Thus, even if the argument from truthmaking is indecisive, disjunctive properties should be rejected. (shrink)

This note falls into two main parts. In the first part, I shall consider the question of whether or not Aristotle believed that there can be true statements about what will happen in the future. I will first clarify this question, which will involve consideration of some logical and metaphysical notions in Aristotle. I will then argue that the answer to the question is ‘No’ (with a qualification). In the second part, I shall argue that his view is correct. I (...) will do this ‘indirectly’, by way of presenting and refuting three prominent objections to the view. (shrink)

What I call Mellor’s Question is the problem of whether determinables are properties of their determinates or properties of the particulars that possess these determinates. One can distinguish two basic competing theories of determinables that address the issue, implicitly if not explicitly. On the second-order theory, determinables are second-order properties of determinate properties; on the second-level theory, determinables are first-order properties of the particulars with these determinate properties. Higher-order properties are prima facie ontologically uneconomical, and in line with my general (...) view that ontological parsimony is vital to metaphysics, I consider it highly important which of the two theories is true. Firstly, I argue that the second-level theory offers the best explanation of the explananda (though the race is close), including the important but neglected phenomenon of ‘intermediate determinables’. Secondly, by paying attention to intermediate determinables and instantiation of higher-order properties, I argue that the second-level theory also is more ontologically economical. For these two reasons, this theory is preferable. (shrink)

On the notion of responsibility employed by John Passmore in his classic Man’s Responsibility for Nature, the relationship of responsibility can only hold between persons (human beings, subjects), or groups and communities of them, and other persons. And in this relationship the persons that are responsible 'to' other persons are responsible 'for' how their actions affect these other persons, not to the direct object of these actions (in this case: nature). If this is correct, we cannot be responsible to nature (...) without conceiving of it as a ‘pseudo-person’, as Passmore calls it. However, non-anthropocentric environmental ethics requires such a moral relationship. The question is, therefore, how this can be allowed in a metaphysically acceptable way. To answer this I first provide an account of what it means to stand in the relation of being ‘responsible to’. Next, I describe two major paradigmatic examples of the metaphysics of nature that perfectly match the thesis that we can, and should, be responsible to nature (the Spinoza-inspired view and the Gaia hypothesis). Unfortunately, they have to be rejected for common sense or naturalist reasons. Finally, I therefore defend a 'fictionalist' view of nature (as person-like) that allows for this relationship. (shrink)

Pietroski (1993) offers a semantics for belief sentences that is supposed to address the problem of equivalence. This paper argues that his proposal fails to solve the problem.

I defend an ontological distinction between three kinds of relation: internal,external and grounded relations. Even though, as we shall see, this trichotomy is basic, it is not found in influential contemporary metaphysics. Specifically, the widespread tendency, exemplified notably by David Armstrong, of not recognizing grounded relations as distinct from external relations, can be shown to be mistaken. I propose a definition of each of the three kinds of relation. Of vital importance to the parsimony of metaphysics, I also argue that (...) only external relations are ontologically fundamental. (shrink)

In “Two Dogmas”, Quine indicates that Carnap’s Aufbau fails “in principle” to reduce our knowledge of the external world to sense data. This is because in projecting the sensory material to reconstruct the physical world, Carnap gives up the use of operating rules and switches to a procedure informed by general principles. This procedure falls short of providing an eliminative translation for the connective “is at”, which is necessary for the reduction. In dissecting Quine’s objection, I argue that Quine has (...) at best proven the claim that the use of general principles essentially fails the task of radical reductionism. However, in order to establish the conclusion that the Aufbau fails in principle, Quine needs to further vindicate two other claims. They are: first, a switch from operating rules to general principles is necessary; second, the set of general principles Carnap adopts is the best alternative. By disambiguating the notion of “explicit definition” and examining the concept of definability in the Aufbau, I explore the possibility of justifying these two claims that Quine overlooks in his objection. The result suggests that Quine’s objection stands in tension with his radical reductionist reading of the Aufbau. (shrink)

In this paper, I relate key features of Adolf Reinach’s abundant ontology of propositional states of affairs of his to Armstrong’s—or an Armstrongian—state of affairs ontology, with special regard to finding out how sparse or abundant the latter is with respect to negative states of affairs. After introducing the issue, I clarify the notion of a propositional state of affairs, paying special attention to the notion of abstract versus concrete. I show how Reinach’s states of affairs are propositional, and how (...) they compare with Chisholm’s well-known propositional states of affairs. In the next section, I outline Reinach’s five roles for states of affairs and show that only one of them is relevant to Armstrongian state of affairs ontology. In the following section, I utilise this role to create a ranking of state of affairs ontologies according to how abundant they are. It is, however, unclear which level Armstrongian state of affairs ontology is at, since it is unclear if, like Reinach’s ontology, it includes negative states of affairs. In the final section, I argue that the answer is a qualified ‘yes’, i.e. it does not occupy the sparsest level. (shrink)

Bermúdez argues for rational framing effects in the form of quasi-cyclical preferences. This is supposed to refute the extensionality principle in standard decision theory. In response, I argue that it is better to analyze seemingly quasi-cyclical preferences as ceteris paribus preferences. Furthermore, if frames are included as objects of choice, we can acknowledge rational framing effects without rejecting extensionality.

Typical agreements can be seen as joint decisions, inherently involving obligations of a distinctive kind. These obligations derive from the joint commitment' that underlies a joint decision. One consequence of this understanding of agreements and their obligations is that coerced agreements are possible and impose obligations. It is not that the parties to an agreement should always conform to it, all things considered. Unless one is released from the agreement, however, one has some reason to conform to it, whatever else (...) is true. In this sense, one is under an obligation to the other parties. The relevance of these points to the issue of political obligation is discussed. (shrink)

Phillips argues that blindsight is due to response criterion artefacts under degraded conscious vision. His view provides alternative explanations for some studies, but may not work well when one considers several key findings in conjunction. Empirically, not all criterion effects are decidedly non-perceptual. Awareness is not completely abolished for some stimuli, in some patients. But in other cases, it was clearly impaired relative to the corresponding visual sensitivity. This relative dissociation is what makes blindsight so important and interesting.

This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.

Surveying nearly seven decades of habitual and obsessive reading, I consider how my character and psychology used reading to shape philosophical questions that move me into forms in which I could pursue them by reading. This became both the method and the substance of my philosophical work. It preserved some core emotional issues but also gave me the way to integrate them into scholarship and into my life.

Among other things, this paper considers what so-called collective guilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed be guilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do something and to act in light of that intention. An account of collective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting. Finally, a "plural subject" account of collective guilt feelings is (...) articulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt as a body. (shrink)

L'antigiudaismo cristiano è essenzialmente la credenza che il popolo ebraico debba rinunciare alla propria fede e convertirsi al cristianesimo. In questo testo viene studiata la prima forma sistematica di antigiudaismo sviluppata in termini filosofici e teologici da Agostino d'Ippona. Alla luce dell'analisi filosofica sembra che l'avversione di Agostino per la fede ebraica si fondi su un'autentica rimozione della specificità del popolo eletto, della Legge e della Rivelazione sul Sinai.

Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of one's own cognitive processes in various domains; for example, memory and perception. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is applied to different tasks or if self-evaluative processes are domain specific. Here, we investigated this issue directly by examining the neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments were made by human participants of both sexes during perceptual and memory tasks matched for stimulus and performance characteristics. By comparing patterns (...) of fMRI activity while subjects evaluated their performance, we revealed both domain-specific and domain-general metacognitive representations. Multivoxel activity patterns in anterior prefrontal cortex predicted levels of confidence in a domain-specific fashion, whereas domain-general signals predicting confidence and accuracy were found in a widespread network in the frontal and posterior midline. The demonstration of domain-specific metacognitive representations suggests the presence of a content-rich mechanism available to introspection and cognitive control. (shrink)

William Vallicella (2020) puts forward three arguments against self-relating internalism, my theory of the unity of states of affairs. His first objection is that there can be no constituent of a state of affairs with the required unifying power given the need for ‘ontological analysis’, or at least that such an entity is mysterious. His second objection is that self-relating internalism violates the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. His final objection is that my explanation of the unity of states (...) of affairs is viciously circular. In this note, I argue that each of challenges can be met. (shrink)

Matthew Lipman claims that the community of inquiry is an exemplar of democracy in action. To many proponents the community of inquiry is considered invaluable for achieving desirable social and political ends through education for democracy. But what sort of democracy should we be educating for? In this paper I outline three models of democracy: the liberal model, which emphasises rights and duties, and draws upon pre-political assumptions about freedom; communitarianism, which focuses on identity and participation in the creation of (...) political ends; and deliberative self-governance, whereby citizens deliberatively shape their collective lives in public forums—at various levels of government and in different political and social arenas. I argue that some kind of deliberative democracy is defensible as a preliminary justification for how citizens might shape their lives, and therefore compatible with other forms of democracy, insofar as they can result from democratic deliberations. Acceptance of such a view raises further questions about the purpose or aims of education consistent with this conception of democracy. I contend that it requires an educational model that is committed to aligning curriculum, pedagogy, assessment and school governance to produce a transformational environment that will inform our structures—a commitment to democratic education and not merely education for democracy. Lipman goes part of the way to achieving these ends, but learning how to be proficient at democratic decision-making is like all tasks children and adolescents learn to perform. It involves action, understanding, and awareness of what counts as doing the task adequately. (shrink)